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Introduction 
 
The title of this paper is not self-explanatory. I shall briefly indicate 
what I am driving at. 
 
(1) Ecology, as a science of inter-relations of all beings, has since the 
1960s gained dramatically in significance for practically every question 
humans raise about their future. The bulk of scientific data is 
overwhelming. But the increase of problems of practical importance 
shows a steeper curve of increase than that of ecological knowledge. 
Result: increase of bewildering uncertainty. We recognize that a main 
problem in the 1990s will be the wise use of data and the mobilization 
of political and individual will to support wisdom of interaction with all 
beings. In a word, we shall need constraint and ecosophy as much as we 
need ecology. By an ecosophy I mean a total view inspired in part by 
fundamental ecological insights in our bewildering situation. 
 
(2) Today a total view must include tentative answers to the question of 
whether the ultimate goals of humanity are best served by a population 
of the size projected for the next century, or perhaps by a fraction of 
that size. If the latter is accepted, the question must be faced whether it 
is practically hopeless today to prepare for a politically, but not 
geologically, long range change in the preferred direction. But 
ecosophy must also answer whether the non-human world with its 
wealth and diversity of life forms, the habitats of animals, plants, and 
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other life forms, would profit from a smaller (and better behaved) 
human population. Here the answer is yes. 
 
(3) The slogan now adopted worldwide, “sustainable development” 
might be interpreted differently, but the interpretation accepted here is 
such that ecologically long range sustainable development is implied. 
Again, to arrive at policies satisfying this norm, a total view is relevant. 
What does it imply for the rich nations? For the poor? It is here argued 
that the implications are vast and cover every aspect of a society and the 
life style of its members. The conclusion rests in part on descriptions of 
what is going on in the oceans, on land, and in the atmosphere. 
Total Views and their Articulation as Systems 
Humans are sometimes called bundles of contradictions.  
And, certainly, we often surrender to impulses that seem to be 
inconsistent with our value priorities or assumptions about social or 
other realities. Nevertheless, as persons, we at least implicitly presume 
that we have certain consistent value-priorities. Most of these form 
conclusions from premises which are in part factual hypotheses or 
assumptions. 
 
The phrase “priorities of value” might mislead because it does not point 
to the vast number of hypotheses that a person presupposes, when 
announcing the value priorities. 
 
The term “philosophy” might mislead because it points mainly to the 
fundamental and near fundamental norms and hypotheses. But in an 
ecosophy the decisions in particular situations are decisive. 
 
The term “total view” has, to some extent, the same weakness as 
philosophy. But I hope it suggests both fundamentality and practice, 
whereas philosophy often only suggests the first.  
 
What practical importance does the total-view concept have in 
environmental conflicts? 
 
My experience is that conflicts between experts are coloured by the 
throwing to and fro of information against one another. They who 
combine factual arguments with value priority arguments and 
fundamental principles are likely to win, at least in the long run. Those 
who are not experts should, as integrated persons, argue from 
fundamental principles and support those decision-makers who 
combine this in their utterances as experts. Ecosophia is an aspect of 
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general wisdom (sophia), and wisdom must show up in wise actions, 
the implementation of wise decisions. Knowledge is not enough for any 
wise decision; it is not only a knowledgeable decision. Decisions, if 
they are to be wise, must take everything relevant into account and this 
includes not only facts but basic rules or norms. Because knowledge of 
what will be the immediate, not to mention remote, consequences of an 
action is limited, a decision will in general be made on the basis of 
uncertain premises of very different kinds. Therefore, in principle, the 
premises of any decision whatsoever are all embracing. In this sense, 
any decision by a mature person implies the pretension of a total view 
as its foundation. Let us take the question of wolf/human relationships 
as an example. 
 
In wolf/human philosophy I neglect astronomy and astrology, implicitly 
asserting that they are irrelevant. If a strong believer in astrology 
objects, I will admit my only very limited knowledge of it, but repeat 
my verdict, this time explicitly: Astrology is irrelevant. One of my 
indefinite number of implicit premises is made explicit! We cannot 
neglect politics, and politics is, from a cognitive (knowledge and 
acquaintance-related) point of view, based on political philosophy. 
  
Standard cost/benefit analysis cannot do the whole job. Factual analysis 
cannot do the whole job. Factual analysis presupposes norms in order to 
arrive at proposals for decision. Benefit for which ethically acceptable 
goals? For which long range global goals? Adequate wolf policies 
require consideration of ultimate or fundamental norms and their 
application to local and global strategies of action. The question is: 
Cost/benefit in relation to which immense sets of partly incompatible 
and even incompatible systems of norms and hypotheses? A fragment 
of an answer relative to wolves in an area where they interact with 
sheep and sheep-owner in a particular country, Norway, will be given 
later in this article. 
  
It is clearly the responsibility of the highly educated (in the limited 
sense of university education) to articulate norms and hypotheses 
beyond standard cost/benefit analysis. But, unfortunately, experts and 
researchers with such education have a tendency to avoid norms and 
values at a fundamental level. One of their ways of justifying this is to 
proclaim that technology and science are based only on facts and 
hypotheses, not norms, not on sentences with unavoidable, irreducible 
exclamation marks. This claim of objectivity is an illusion well worth 
inspecting in some detail. 
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Given that chains of derivation cannot be infinite, they must start with 
definite statements. One can justify A with B and B with C, but at a 
definite time, in a definite situation, one has to stop somewhere, taking 
certain norms as ultimate or fundamental. In methodology there are 
rules of procedure, in logic there are rules of inference. They can be 
derived from fundamental rules. A rule as a kind of norm is properly 
expressed with an exclamation mark, not a full stop. That a rule, if 
followed, has certain consequences may be expressed by a sentence 
ending with a full stop, but a sentence saying that the rule or the 
consequence is good should properly end with an exclamation mark. 
Most rules assumed to be fundamental seem to be absolutely obvious, 
but sometimes derived rules seem more intuitively obvious, for instance 
in arithmetic. In normative systems, the fundamental norms which 
constitute kinds of rules normally appear to be obviously valid to those 
accepting the system. One may say that they tend to be accepted 
through intuition, like the basic rules of logical inference. In the 
philosophy of mathematics and metamathematics, controversies exist 
about competing systems (constructivist, logicist, formalist, intuitionist, 
etc.) in which intuitive acceptance plays an inescapable role. 
  
The importance of the above stems from the widespread, unsupportable 
view that if one is a scientist one starts and ends with factual 
statements, sentences ending with full stops. But one never gets going 
without methodological and logical rules, and some of them cannot be 
validated within one's system. Unvalidated rules are necessary to 
validate a claim that such and such is a fact. To show that a 
fundamental rule (R1) is useful, successful, or valid, one must include 
these properties in the conclusion one infers from premises, say 
observation sentences. But how, from those premises, does one reach a 
conclusion? Only by rule. So one either uses R1, going in circles, or use 
a new fundamental rule, R2, whereby the same trouble as to how to 
prove that rule is encountered. 
  
The appreciation of the necessity of taking some rules as fundamental 
in scientific work makes it easier to accept that we have to do the same 
in handling normative systems. Here the most important rules are of an 
ethical character. However, that should not make one call them 
“subjective” or mere “expressions of feeling.” There is less agreement, 
it seems, and certainly less clear disagreement on fundamental ethical 
views than on methodology and logic. The statistics of agreement or 
disagreement do not, however, make them subjective or objective in 
any strict sense. 
  
Volume 21, Number 1 75
For simplicity of discussion we need some kind of model to facilitate 
the complex pattern of argument. We propose an ecosophic model in 
the form of a normative system. A normative system is not a 
psychological system showing how we actually think and how people 
or institutions actually arrive at decisions. It is not a causal or genetic 
system. It shows logical priority: a premise is logically prior to a 
conclusion. In it, fundamental value priorities form ultimate premises. 
The term is used for a set of norms and hypotheses arranged to show 
what is derived from what, rarely by strict logical inference, but derived 
in a loose way from premises. 
  
In a normative system three levels may be distinguished. One contains 
ultimate or fundamental norms derived from the first level sentences, 
plus further hypotheses. A third level contains sentences expressing 
concrete decisions in specific situations. The situations are described by 
factual assertions, or hypotheses. 
  
A model of such a system is not constructed once and for all, but 
articulated as we continue to debate the merits and demerits of 
alternative decisions, using what we already have articulated and 
adding what is needed to reach new decisions. 
  
In the illustrations the use of exclamation marks and full stops needs 
elucidation. 
 
The sentence “Less taxes!” may function to express an announcement 
that less taxes are desirable, or that there should be less taxes, or that it 
is ethically or morally mandatory or obligatory that there should be less 
taxes. All of these modal variables are included in my use of the 
exclamation mark, or with the term from modal logic, the !-operator. 
There is also a more fundamental use covered. For example, if God 
said, "Let there be something!" when so far there was nothing, there 
was no receiver of the message. A norm is meaningful, just as are 
hypotheses, independent of a specification of receivers of the message. 
Furthermore, a norm has, just like hypotheses, a partial testability. 
There is methodology how to judge the validity of norms. In short, one 
should not overrate the cognitive dissimilarity between norms and 
hypotheses.1
 
Let us imagine there is a systematization of a total view called 
Ecosophy T. (Actually there are only tiny fragments worked out). One 
of its norms has been thus formulated: “Ecological policies should not 
imperil the continuation of evolution, including speciation on Earth!” A 
hypothesis concerning the same topic says that the peril is yearly 
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increasing. Against such an hypothesis some people have recently 
claimed that continued speciation is increasingly secured by several, 
mutually isolated Nature reserves or, essentially, through an 
archipelago of reserves. They then argue that "speciation will occur in 
such a system because of the isolation between the reserves." A 
prominent researcher in this field, Michael Soule, has this to say: 
 
The flaw in this reasoning is that reserves are much smaller than real big islands, 
and that it is likely that a species will go extinct in most of the reserves long before 
the evolution of significant differences. Extinction appears to be very common in 
small reserves or on small islands. Of course, if the reserves are managed 
intensively, it is possible to rescue such species before they go extinct, but the very 
tools that we use for rescuing species, namely introducing individuals from one 
population into another (artificial gene flow, transfers), will prevent speciation 
from occurring. Ironically, the medicine that prevents extinction also prevents 
speciation.2
 
The expansion of human habitats has not always reduced richness and 
diversity of life. When, after the ice age, humans went up the 
Norwegian coast, they eventually burnt some forests completely. A new 
kind of landscape developed. It is amusing to note that today there is an 
increasing opinion which favours protection some of these treeless 
areas as part of Nature conservation. Incidentally, the effort to build up 
forest along the coast does not result in a rich ecosystem because of 
standardization. Only a few profitable kinds of wood are planted. So a 
future destruction of this man-made wood would be an advantage, 
perhaps. 
 
I mention this in order to emphasize the complexity of the processes 
since the last Ice Age, and to counteract the opinion that very radical 
views on environmental questions need be hostile to humans. 
  
An example of how seemingly narrow policy questions involve 
immense or indefinitely wide areas of norms and hypotheses can easily 
be given. Consider the policies (in Norway) concerning the protection 
of wolves in areas with scattered, small sheep owners. 
  
Some relevant norms to this context are: 
 
A1– Severe suffering endured by a living being X is of no less negative 
value than severe suffering endured by a living being Y, whatever the 
species or population of X and Y! 
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The term “living being” is ambiguous. It includes the human species, 
but, until further notice, we are to think here mostly of non-humans. 
The norm A1 is highly relevant in discussions regarding the severe pain 
or panic of sheep and other domestic animals which are attacked but not 
killed by wolves. 
  
A second example of a norm in Ecosophy T: 
 
A2– Humans have an obligation not to place their domestic animals in a 
situation where there is a significant risk of severe suffering! 
  
A more precise formulation will take into account the difference 
between a sheep owner in a very rich community and one in a region of 
general human hunger and deprivation. Obviously there cannot in such 
cases exist any severe obligation of the kind intended in Norm A2. 
  
Who is responsible for the suffering of sheep in a mixed community 
including wolves? Laws against killing wolves may be thought to make 
the lawmaker to some extent responsible, therefore obliging him to help 
protect the sheep by, for instance, financing shepherds. 
  
Scarcely covered by the norm A1 is the general decrease of life quality 
of a group or herd of sheep that has suffered after a wolf attack. This 
decrease is, in part, reflected in a decrease of the economic value of the 
affected sheep on the market. But that is another matter. As for 
definitions of “life quality,” we limit ourselves to referring to recent 
literature on the subject.3
  
It is argued by people who support conservation of wildlife that, given 
that there are more than two million sheep in Norway but only a 
handful of wolves, the violent death or suffering of a sheep should not 
be taken as seriously as that of a wolf. A very doubtful norm. We would 
rather accept the following: 
 
A3– The negative value of the severe suffering of an animal belonging 
to a large population has no less negative value than that of an animal 
of a small population. 
  
This norm seems to go against the grain. It is human to treat animals 
more coldly, when there are masses of them. In years when lemmings 
are abundant, people hiking with their dogs are likely to let them “have 
fun” with lemmings, than in years when lemmings are interesting as a 
rarity. We also reject the view that the sheep is a less developed, dumb 
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animal compared to the superbly intelligent and beautiful wolf, and that 
it therefore deserves less consideration. Beauty or intelligence is 
completely irrelevant in application of the norm. 
  
There are considerable differences in identification among people. 
Some tend, we are glad to say, to identify positively with the underdog 
or ugly duckling; others identify with the winner, the clever, the 
intelligent, the beautiful. This influences our attitudes toward 
spectacular predators. (Human predators identify with other predators?) 
Some, not all, take into account the suffering itself as our responsibility. 
 
A4– If a traditional sheep area, by decree from central authorities, is to 
be considered an area where wolves are protected, it is up to the central 
authorities to arrange for fair and swift compensation for losses, and/or 
financial support for hiring shepherds! 
  
The last norm is, of course, highly controversial. It is, however, in 
accordance with main trends in green politics and with principles of an 
welfare society of the Scandinavian non-socialist, social democratic 
type. Norway has ratified the great Bern treaty of protection of wild 
animals, including wolves, but the rules are usually evaded by clauses 
concerning “special circumstances.” 
  
In short, wolf protection policies involve every question related to 
interaction between humans and animals; furthermore, they involve 
every major question of general ethics, politics, cultural anthropology, 
and, of course, economics. Questions of war, peace, and independence 
are involved because there may be a choice to be made considering the 
possibility that Norway may be occupied in the future, like it was 
during the Second World War. Cultural resistance towards the occupier 
is highly dependent upon self-reliance, and local self-reliance is easier 
with a lot of sheep than with a lot of wolves. 
Long Range Population Reduction 
Two issues are of special relevance here: (1) The reduction of 
wilderness, or more generally, free Nature, through wanton destruction 
with no long range considerations; (2) The reduction of wilderness 
through seemingly inescapable expansion of human habitats through 
mere multiplication of the number of humans. 
  
In what follows, it is the latter process I shall consider. The basic 
population question for a philosophy of life may be thus formulated: 
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What is the relation between the magnitude of the human population 
and the outlook for maximum satisfaction of human basic needs and 
aspirations? Are 10 billion, 1 billion, or 100 million seemingly good 
numbers? 
  
There are other ways of forming the question. Population 
considerations center around (1) bulk, (2) distribution, and (3) per 
capita interference with Nature. Ecosophy demands that the present 
state of affairs be studied in relation to these dimensions, and the 
present state be confronted with the basic norms and hypotheses of a 
total view. 
  
As to basic goals in individual human life, there are three different 
families of ideas. We may name them using the terms pleasure, 
happiness, and perfection.4 Our problem may then be formulated as 
follows: What bulk, distribution, and interference is required for 
maximum attainment of the supreme human goals of pleasure, 
happiness, or perfection? 
  
As to collective basic goals, I postulate richness and deep diversity of 
cultures. There should be space for independent developments in 
various non-predictable directions.  
  
I am going to conclude from a considerable amount of hypotheses and 
norms, and the maximum satisfaction of values is more likely with a 
smaller bulk of the human population than at present, as well as a 
different distribution, and also a considerably smaller amount of 
interference per capita than in contemporary industrial countries. That 
is, reduction of human population is required for the sake of human, 
abstracting from considerations of other living beings. 
  
This last conclusion is important mainly because many people think 
that population reduction is only meaningful if done for the sake of 
non-humans, or because of a lamentable necessity due to the limitation 
of the planet. 
  
I take for granted that we all agree that an increase of the bulk of the 
population, a wider, indiscriminate distribution, and a necessary 
increase of interference per capita in poor countries, will further reduce 
the already rapidly dwindling areas of free Nature. It is a welcome and 
important result of our reflection, that maximum satisfaction of human 
needs and aspirations does not require billions of individuals. The 
welcomeness and importance should be duly experienced, before 
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proceeding to the complicated long range problems of how to promote 
stabilization and reduction of the human population. 
  
If your personal motivation for preaching population reduction is 
mainly concern for non-human life forms, for continued evolution, and 
for the planet, is it not dishonest to concentrate on reduction for the 
sake of humans themselves? 
  
It is not dishonest to use even 90 per cent of argumentation in favour of 
humans, provided one honestly believes in what one says. Working 
through argumentation for a great, long range goal, those arguments 
which carry most weight must be used for what they are worth. 
  
Is procreation to be considered a human right? It should, I think, but 
then the term must be understood to imply only one child. Perhaps one 
might insist that the set of human rights is not eternal, but changes, and 
that as long as there is a deep discrepancy between (1) the procreation 
habits and many human rights; for example, to nourishment, home, 
space and (2) between the procreation habits and the limits to growth, 
there cannot be a human right to procreation. If this position is taken, it 
seems that we would have to announce that procreation is a privilege, 
like driving a car. You may drive a car, but only if you fulfill certain 
requirements of age, skill, etc. This is, I think, to go too far. But in 
practice, in determining social obligations, such as paying taxes, 
procreation will be treated as a privilege. The welfare state gets the 
difficult problem of seeing to it that the opportunity of procreation, like 
that of education, does not depend heavily on the level of income. 
  
How many women in the Third World want no more children than the 
ones they already have? The World Fertility Survey reported that in 
1980 about half of all women interviewed said they wanted no more. 
Nevertheless, men may insist that they should have more, or they 
simply make the women pregnant as part of their life style and sign of 
virility. Anyhow, even if men do not demand more children, absence of 
contraceptives may cause millions of children to appear.5
  
The efforts of population planning may be seen from two angles: (1) 
The kinds of efforts involved, and (2) the magnitude of each. If we use 
the yardstick of war-time efforts, the magnitude expected is that 
adequate to solve the problem. 
  
Let us consider efforts to support family planning in poor countries as 
an example. From recent Chinese data we may accept that at least 100 
full-time personnel per million inhabitants are required for organizing 
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the communication and education program concerning family 
planning.6 There are very few organizations operating outside of China 
in poor countries. At least 100,000 more workers are needed. This is not 
a very big number considering the immense task, and it is a task for rich 
countries to help establish such a personnel force. As many as possible 
of the organizers should have some training in argumentation from the 
basis of total views. In that way, the fundamental goals of human 
existence would more clearly partake in fixing the concrete goals of the 
family plans. Conclusion: Magnitude of problem gigantic, the ways of 
implementation highly problematic, involving grave ethical and other 
norms. (But this is, of course, no excuse for passivity.) 
  
Sincere respect for a culture deeply different from one's own does not 
imply active support for those traits which, from the point of view of 
one's own culture, contradict central norms or hypotheses. More 
difficult is the problem of how to behave in relation to those in 
opposition to their own culture, who embrace a norm we find central, 
but which is considered invalid in the foreign culture. Can we permit 
ourselves actively to support the opposition? What are the 
consequences of the support, is it perhaps counter-productive? 
  
For example, it can be argued that the rate of population growth of the 
Masai is obviously not sustainable. We think we see undesirable 
consequences for their children. They will face significantly worse 
living conditions and be incapable of continuing their nomadic 
traditions: it will be of no avail to change pastures because all the other 
pastures are already occupied and overgrazed. There will be no space 
for more nomads. It is on this basis, as an effort to support their culture, 
that it is permissible to support the Masai with whom we already agree, 
and to help this minority to increase their influence in ways that are 
acceptable from their ethical and political points of view. 
  
Population stabilization and eventual reduction is a necessary condition 
for the richness and diversity of human cultures. This seems obvious 
enough when considering the pressures to expand or to protect existing 
borders against aggressive neighbours. Many cultures are today invaded 
because of lack of available soil for the young generations. Other 
cultural problems are also aggravated through the lack of population 
stability. 
  
The above exemplifies derivations of norms and hypotheses from at 
least one ecosophy, ecosophy T. Other ecosophies may have other 
norms or other hypotheses and view the population problems in a 
different light. 
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Experts' Unavoidable Support of Ecologically 
Nonsensical Decisions 
Politicians and big firms in the rich countries need to underpin some of 
their decisions through reference to hired experts. Their function is not 
to air their innermost beliefs, but to answer definite, limited questions. 
Unavoidably, they will often, not always, directly or indirectly support 
political, especially governmental, decisions that are contrary to what 
they firmly believe are meaningful in the broadest and deepest context, 
that is, are nonsensical from an ecosophical view. 
  
If a complete argumentation pattern dealing with ecosophical issues 
lacks reference to ultimate goals and premises, it deserves the 
appellation non-deep, or, admitting the normative basis of the 
judgment, shallow. The distinction between a deep and a shallow 
ecology movement does not apply to individual arguments, or 
obviously not to people. 
  
People who have political power often complain that their range of 
politically realistic decisions is considerably overrated. It is not realized 
how much pressure, in how many directions, is severely limiting the 
range. Experts or others who are asked to furnish facts and give advice 
to these so-called powerful people are usually thought of as people 
telling exactly what they think would be the best decision (in the long 
run). This is a dangerous illusion. It is a dangerous illusion because it 
fosters a negative attitude towards experts which prevents people from 
contacting them privately. We can learn a lot from them “under four 
eyes.” 
  
Suppose decisions A, B, and C are politically realistic. An expert is 
asked to give advice and explains that B is best. But from the point of 
view of global, long range sustainable development, A, B and C are 
more or less nonsensical. But better decisions D, E, or F are not 
relevant. An adviser dwelling on those will scarcely be asked in the 
future. 
  
I am not here claiming that policy makers and their advisers are making 
nonsensical decisions daily, but I regret that they cannot, at least once a 
year, admit through the mass media that current decisions are 
nonsensical from a long-range, global, or fundamental point of view. 
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Given the power distribution within a policy making group, the 
question facing the individual participant is how to choose between a 
set of decisions of unequal degree of nonsense. The rationality of the 
choice is therefore a rather special one. It is rational in relation to a 
special, intricate power structure. 
  
An example: The conservative government of a small but very rich 
industrial country published in 1982 a program of economic policies for 
the next 20 years, that is from 1982 to 2005, taking into account the 
somewhat dark outlook for the rest of the 1980s. The government 
announced the necessity of reducing public expenditures; but what 
about private consumption? Essentially only three choices seemed to be 
at hand: to decree to say nothing about private consumption, or say 
unreservedly that it could increase, or to say some cautious words about 
increase. The only ecologically responsible decision was to announce a 
decrease in private consumption, but that was impossible for a 
conservative government at the time. The decision chosen was to say 
that the rate of increase of private consumption should be dampened. 
This is like a leader of an expedition who sees that they must not go 
further towards the north, but must turn south, saying that they should 
go less fast towards the north. 
  
The main ecosophical norm implied is that of universalizability: You 
should not recommend a level of consumption that you cannot seriously 
desire others could have. Evidently, others, including people in non-
industrial countries, cannot reach the level of consumption, including 
the level of sheer waste, of the small rich country, without catastrophic 
consequences for all. Consider, for example, the use of paper. There 
would be no trees left, and substitutes, for instance grass, would require 
unwise energy consumption. 
  
The most powerful way to politically realistic and ecosophically 
responsible decisions in the rich countries is to activate the grassroots, 
the ecologically enlightened section of the general public. Politicians 
with green inclinations deplore reluctance to instruct and influence the 
people they meet in daily life. Ecological activism is not primarily 
participation in collective direct actions (demonstrations, etc.) but 
persistent work for the dissemination of ideas and the exemplification 
of ways of living. 
  
Many politicians are today aware of substantial increases in ecological 
awareness and are able to stick their necks further out and courageously 
propose policies they did not dare propose until now. They are then in a 
better position to ask experts to work out alternatives which make 
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sense. But the scale of the problems is unprecedented, and the absence 
of well established pressure groups in the service of the Earth will 
continue to severely limit the scope of politically realistic projects. 
The Brundtland Report and Sustainable Development 
The recommendations of the Brundtland Report are agreed upon by a 
number of politicians with different opinions and already for that reason 
vague and ambiguous, admitting many mutually incompatible 
interpretations. This sounds like a drawback, but if we conceive the 
Report as one expressing an extremely complicated process in the 
human world, it is a valuable feature which makes it possible for 
different countries to implement somewhat different policies referring 
to the same source of inspiration and thus strengthening the feeling of 
action in support of a “common future.” 
  
Whatever the plausible interpretation chosen, it may be safely said that 
a country according to the Report is not developing sustainably if it is 
not developing ecologically in a sustainable way. From the point of 
view of ecosophy this is of prime importance. The people accepting the 
Report may be said to announce a norm “Ecosophically sustainable 
development!” The interpretation here chosen is to view the sentence as 
synonymous to “Global, long-range, ecologically sustainable 
development!” The actual situation today as described (hypothesized) 
in publications such as The State of the World 1988 is such that a very 
elementary implication of the negative norm gains supreme importance: 
"Elimination of long range ecologically unsustainable developments!" 
Perhaps this norm is more adequate than the positive because of an idea 
until recently associated with the term “development”: The idea that 
every patch of the surface of the Earth should somehow serve narrow 
human purposes. 
In order to simplify discussion, the task to be done may be illustrated by 
a quasi-quantitative illustration. If Pu symbolizes unecological (not long 
range sustainable) features of a way of production, Cu symbolizes the 
same relative to consumption, and N the number of people involved, 
 
 (Pu + Cu) x N 
 
may symbolize what must be reduced drastically according to the 
elimination norm. Using current prediction of population and poverty 
development, the situation will be coloured by a very big factor Pu + Cu 
in the rich countries and a factor N increasing rapidly. There is not 
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much gained by trying to compare the adverse effects of Pu, Cu, and 
increases in N. In the Old World (Europe and part of Asia) increasing N 
through the centuries has changed and impoverished landscapes 
drastically through human habitation. What now goes on in Brazil and 
other parts of the New World resembles in essential ways what 
happened long ago in the Old. This has certain implication for the 
proper attitude to be shown, which will be noted in a later section. 
  
The term “global sustainability” should be discussed. The interpretation 
used here is such that it implies the absence of human interference in 
the ecosystems of the globe which are unnecessary for the realization of 
the ultimate goals of humankind. Wasteful interference is basically 
interference unrelated and unnecessary for the realization of such goals. 
Waste in this sense is immense, relying on hypotheses of the kind 
published in The State of the World 1988 and on current ideas of what 
the ultimate goals are. 
  
Using a less technical terminology, the norm to abstain from excessive 
interference may be interpreted as a norm not to decrease the richness 
and diversity of life on Earth, using the term “life” in a broad sense. It 
implies respect for the habitats of animals and plants, not only a norm 
to abstain from total species extinction. The satisfying of vital needs of 
humans obviously implies the destruction of some habitats of many 
other living beings, but what now happens is wanton destruction on a 
vast scale clearly unrelated to ultimate goals. 
  
The prospect of a turn of the tide, turning increasing unsustainability 
into a development of decreasing unsustainability gains in likelihood 
when life and landscapes are in a holistic way conceived to have value 
in themselves, not only as resources for the satisfaction of some 
narrowly defined human needs. Such an ecosystem oriented conception 
is found in every culture, but has had little influence in recent centuries 
compared to the results of efforts to exploit, dominate, and sometimes 
gain power through mere numbers.  
Western Self-criticism and Activism 
Plato complained: "Compared to how the forests were previously, what 
is now left is like the skeleton left of a sick man." Since his time the 
substitution of tree-plantations for forests has proceeded relentlessly. 
Europe has practically nothing left of primordial forests and very little 
left of forests with a high level of diversity of life forms. The 
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simplification of ecosystems through big buildings, roads, and other 
manifestations of industrialization proceeds on a scale fully comparable 
to the increase of desertification. 
  
What reason have nature loving Westerners to expect from the poor 
countries with rapidly increasing population that they should behave 
any better? When the world's richest nation is still degrading its 
national forests, how can one expect poor nations to save rain forests? 
The effort on the part of the rich nations to stop the total destruction of 
such forests in the poor countries cannot succeed, if at all, without clear 
admittance that the policies of the rich countries have resulted in the 
degradation of life conditions on the planet as a whole and through 
disturbance of habitats and otherwise, on an enormous scale in their 
own territories. The plans of the rich countries to start “developing” the 
Antarctic continent show that they are yet far from conscious of their 
mindless behaviour. 
  
Inspection of the present planned reduction of pollution by the rich 
countries reveals that they are unlikely to turn the tide before the middle 
of the next century. Referring to the symbol (Pu + Cu) x N, this means 
that Pu + Cu is not meant to decline in the foreseeable future. Perhaps 
plans will be much more radical in the ’90s, but that possibility cannot 
be counted on. 
  
As a consequence, global responsibility suggests that the official policy 
of the rich nations should not only be to support stabilization of their 
own populations, but to decrease them. Any effort to stimulate birth-
rate is an insult towards the poor countries. The small N of the rich 
countries may mislead. If we consider item for item what an average 
member of a rich country does during a day, and consider the way the 
things are produced which he or she makes use of, the ecological 
negative results are 10, 50 or 100 times more serious compared with the 
negative results of what a poor global citizen does. That means that a 5-
million population rich country counts as one of 50, 250, or even 500-
million in a poor country. 
  
Western self-criticism has an instrumental value: it makes Western 
activism ethically acceptable. Humility is one thing, activeness another. 
Self-criticism in conflicts in the face of the opponent is part of 
Spinoza's generositas, but he announces generositas et fortitudo, 
generosity and fortitude, unwavering dedication in the pursuit of the 
highest goals. 
  
Volume 21, Number 1 87
Privileged people in the rich countries have the opportunity to 
contemplate the Earth as a whole, to assist minorities in the poor 
countries who see the long range effects of present policies, to criticize 
the indifference of the rich and powerful in those areas, and vigorously 
but non-violently to support the opposition. What is now being done to 
rain forests in Brazil is essentially a new wave of invasion and 
suppression which started in the 15th Century with the European 
invasion of the Americas. Western self-criticism should include what 
people of European descent do in this century. 
  
Fundamental ethical norms in rich countries make denial of the 
following norm difficult: "Don't lead a sort of life you count as 
desirable which you cannot seriously wish that others would lead!" The 
philosophically wasteful way of the average person in rich countries is 
known to be ecologically catastrophic if generalized. The presumption 
that a set of technical revolutions could soon change this conclusion is 
irresponsible. Ethically, the way to go is to accept a change of 
production, consumption, and population so as to make material life in 
the rich countries, as far as it is worthwhile to attain, generalizable. 
Waste in a philosophical sense includes production that rather hinders 
than makes easier the realization of ultimate goals in life. Waste is an 
important part of the average life in a rich country, but rarely 
acknowledged as such. It is part of what is considered the high standard 
of living (as opposed to the quality of life). Therefore it is prudent to 
consider how a decrease of the material standard of living could 
become politically acceptable in the rich countries. This could result in 
a rough equality of material standard of living in poor and rich 
countries. A very unlikely development, but important as a guiding star. 
We would then avoid two blind alleys: the attempt of the poor to 
resemble the rich, and the attempt of the rich to continue an 
unsustainable development.  
 
From the point of view of at least one ecosophy (Ecosophy T) the 
decrease of the material standard of the rich countries need not in the 
long run, result in decrease of quality of life. In the long run an increase 
might be expected. 
  
Life quality research has now come of age as a respected area of social 
research. Using a rather rough general formula, we may say that 
whereas standard of living research measures what you have, that is, 
which means you have at your disposal for feeling good, life quality 
describes to what extent people feel good: how they feel about the 
world themselves, their family life, their jobs, whether they feel lonely, 
feel respected, have economic worries, and so on. Obviously it takes 
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time to describe, and even to measure, material standard of living. The 
potential social and political importance of life quality thinking and 
research stems from the change of perspective, from concentration on 
means to concentration on ends. The turning of the tide towards 
increasing sustainability requires such a change. 
  
The quest for long range ecological sustainability turns upside down the 
application of the distinction between “developed” and “undeveloped” 
countries. Whereas from 1945 to 1985 development was conceived as 
change of ways of production and consumption in exactly the direction 
of the rich countries, development as a plus word now implies change 
in the direction of sustainability. When the rich countries have turned 
the tide and are changing in the direction of sustainability, they deserve 
the name of developing countries. We are now looking forward to a 
state of the world where every country, however unlike in culture, is a 
developing country. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1The semantics of versions of a normative system is based upon elementary concepts 
introduced in Naess, Communication and Argument, Oslo University Press and Allen 
& Unwin 1966. Now SWAN volume 7. For methodology see Naess, Ecology, 
Community and Lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
2Quotation from a letter written October 12, 1984. 
3A preliminary survey of life quality research is easily obtained by looking through 
recent volumes of the periodical Social Indicators Research which contains many 
reports of value. For methodology, see Quality of Life Reserch, INAS, Oslo 1986. 
4A short commentary on pleasure, happiness, and perfection is found on p. 80 in 
Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. 
5Lester Brown, et al., The State of the World 1985, New York: Norton, 1985, p.215. 
6 See, e.g., IPPF Fact Sheet, September 1984. 
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